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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEAN W. CROWTHER,
Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
Utah Court of Appeals # 940228-CA
BRYAN MOWER,
District Court #920905365
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Statement of the Issues:
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals court should reverse Summary Judgement in this case
since a companion case (Crowther v. Mower, No. 930446-CA, Utah App. June 9^ 1994) was
ruled in Appellant's favor and petition for Writ of Certiorari by Appellee (Utah Supreme
Court No. 940354, October 19, 1994) was denied. This case was identical to the Salt Lake
County case and involved property in Summit County. The ruling by Judge David S. Young
involved and included the same issues and opinions as in this case.
2. Whether the trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment when
there was clearly a material factual dispute as to whether Appellant's mother intended to
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presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she sent via certified mail from Utah to Appellant
while he was in California, and that such deed was on its face an absolute conveyance, in
light of the fact that if a factfinder ruled that there was a present intent to transfer the deed on
her part, this would have had the legal effect of destroying the joint tenancy with right of
survivorship that Appellant's mother held with Appellee, and thus would make Appellant and
Appellee tenants in common with respect to the property, and terminate the possibility that
Appellee would take the entire property through Appellee's former right of survivorship when
Appellant's mother died.
3. Whether the trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded by a grantee
does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in the property that is the
subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint tenancy with right of survivorship until
the deed is recorded.
STANDARD OF REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The standard of review for whether a summary judgment was properly granted (and
which is therefore, the standard of review for #1 and 2) is explained in Rule 56 of Utah Code
Unannotated page 151. (1993) " . . . the party against whom the judgment has been granted is
entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the necessary inferences fairly arising
therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to him." Case law on this matter is equally
clear: "On review of a grant of summary judgment to a Plaintiff, the inquiry is whether there
is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Thorncock v. Cook, 604 Rd 934 (Utah 1979).
reviewing the trial court's ruling, we accept the facts and inferences in the light most
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"In

favorable to the losing party. Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, we
may reconsider the trial court's legal conclusions." Winegar y_. Froerer Corp., 813 P.d 104
(Utah 1991) (citing Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.d 1241,
1243 (Utah 1990).
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Nature of the Case
This is a case involving Applellee's deceased wife, Nellie Crowther, who while still
living, destroyed that couple's joint tenancy with right of survivorship when she duly
conveyed and delivered her interest to the land in question in this action by means of a
quitclaim deed to her son, Mr. Mower (Defendant). By doing this, she created a tenancy in
common by Mr. Mower and Plaintiff, which has no rights of survivorship. Plaintiff claims
the quitclaim deed was invalid due to invalid delivery, which is essential in deed transactions.

Course of Proceedings
Appellee filed a complaint in Third District Court of Salt Lake County. Plaintiff then
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings with a supporting memorandum on
or about April 14, 1993. Defendant thereafter, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a
memorandum in support thereof on or about April 28, 1993.. Oral argument before Judge
Leslie A. Lewis took place on January 14, 1994 . Judge Lewis entered Summary Judgment in
favor of Plaintiff, ruling that the deed in question was invalid because appellant did not
record the deed until after Mrs. Crowther's death.
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to reconsider attorney's
fees on or about February 4, 1994. . Defendant filed motion for findings of fact and
conclusions of law on or about February 10, 1994. Judge Lewis did not respond to either
motion. . This appeal was thereafter filed.
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Facts
1 .

Defendant Mower is the only son of Nellie D. Crowther who died on August 9, 1991

2.

Plaintiff was married to Nellie D. Crowther at the time of her death and was living

with her husband, Dean W. Crowther in Salt Lake City, Utah..
3.

On December 15, 1988, Nellie Crowther signed a quitclaim deed conveying her

interest in property located in Salt Lake County, to wit:

Lot 7, Bolck 1, ROCKWOOD SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat
thereof, recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.
to her son, Bryan D. Mower, who at the time was living in Simi Valley, California. The
deed was witnessed by her friend, Mable Hammond, and sent via certified mail to Mr.
Mower along with a letter from Mrs. Crowther's attorney and a codicil to Mrs. Crowther's
original will detailing her action of the quitclaim deed.
4.

The quitclaim deed was recorded in Salt Lake County on August 12, 1991 with the

Salt Lake County Recorder by Bryan Mower, subsequent to Nellie Crowther's Death.

Summary of Arguments
1.

The appeals court should reverse Summary Judgement in this case since a

companion case (Crowther v. Mower, No. 930446-CA, Utah App. June 9^ 1994) was ruled in
Appellant's favor and petition for Writ of Certiorari by Appellee (Utah Supreme Court No.
940354, October 19, 1994) was denied. This case was identical to the Salt Lake County case
and involved property in Summit County. The ruling by Judge David S. Young involved and
included the same issues, facts, laws and opinions as in this case.
5

2.

The trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment

because there was clearly a material factual dispute as to whether Appellant's mother intended
to presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she sent via certified mail from Utah to her son,
Mr. Mower, while he was in California. On its face, the deed conveyed absolute ownership
of the therein mentioned property to her son, Mr. Mower. Only a factfinder's ruling that no
valid delivery took place could cause the conveyance of the deed to be found invalid.
(If the deed were ruled to be duly delivered, the deed would have the legal effect of
destroying the joint tenancy with right of survivorship that Appellant's mother held with
Appellee, and thus would make Appellant and Appellee tenants in common with respect to
the property, and terminate the possibility that Appellee would take the entire property
through Appellee's former right of survivorship when Appellant's mother died.)
3.

The trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded by a

grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in the property that is
the subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint tenancy with right of survivorship
until the deed is recorded. The trial court's application of Utah's recording law was plain
error.

Detail of Argument
Point 1
The Companion Case in Summit County Ruled by this Court
Makes this Case a Moot Point
The Utah Court of Appeals opinion (Exhibit A) was clear on all points of issue
involving Appellee's claims and subsequent judges opinion. According to the opinion, "Mrs.
6

Crowther had no interest in the property at the time of her death, having trasferred her
interest to [Mr.] Mower, and Crowther's ownership interest had already changed from a joint
tenancy to a tenacy in common." (Crowther v. Mower, SEE Exhibit A, Page 4) In addition,
the court stated that the fact Mower delayed recording the quitclaim deed " does not affect
its validity as between him and his mother." (SEE Page 5) The court went on to say: "the
fact a deed is not recorded or that recording is delayed does not affect the validity of a
document with respect to the parties to the document and all other persons." (Utah Code Ann.
57-1-13)
The court also ruled that the deed itself was unambiguous and the letter from Mrs.
Crowther's Attorney, Paul Wharton, along with Mrs. Crowther's Codicil to her will clearly
supports Mrs. Crowther's intent to deliver and convey her interest in the properties in
question. The court stated: "we determine that, as a matter of law, the evidence is
uncontroverted that at the time Mrs. Crowther had the deed(s) delivered, she had the present
intent to convey the Property(s)." The court reversed the summary judgment and entered
judgment in favor of Mr. Mower. A subsequent Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed by
the Appellee along with a opposition to petition by the Appellant. The petition was denied on
October 19, 1994.
The case above is identical to this case. Both the Summit County and Salt Lake
County deeds were sent to Mr. Mower via certified mail at the same time. Since this case is
so similar in nature, content, opinions and results, the case should be decided by this court
summarily in favor of the Appellant.
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Detail of Argument
Point 2
A Trial Court's Granting of Summary Judgment
is Improper When a Dispute to a Material Fact Exists
The trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment because
there was clearly a material factual dispute as to whether Appellant's mother intended to
presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she sent via certified mail from Utah to her son, Mr.
Mower, while he was in California. On its face, the deed conveyed absolute ownership of the
therein mentioned property to her son, Mr. Mower. Only a factfinder's ruling that no valid
delivery took place could cause the conveyance of the deed to be found invalid.
(If the deed were ruled to be effectively delivered, the deed would have the legal
effect of destroying the joint tenancy with right of survivorship that Appellant's mother held
with Appellee, and thus would make Appellant and Appellee tenants in common with respect
to the property, and terminate the possibility that Appellee would take the entire property
through Appellee's former right of survivorship when Appellant's mother died.)
The Supreme Court of Utah, on at least two occasions, has clearly stated that a
grantor's intent to deliver a deed is not one of law, rather one of fact. In Horton v.
Horton, 695 P.d 102, 106 (Utah 1984) the Court ruled: Delivery or its absence is a question
of fact."

See also: Poulson v. Poulson, 672 Rd 97, 99 (Utah 1983). In light of these rulings

by the Utah Supreme Court, the trial judge was clearly wrong by granting summary judgment
on the factual issue concerning Nellie Crowther's intent to transfer ownership when she
conveyed her property to her son, Mr. Mower.
8

Nellie Crowther, Mr. Mower's mother, delivered a deed to Mr. Mower via certified
mail that gave all her interest in the property described therein to Mr. Mower. However,
Appellee wants to have this conveyance ruled void for what he claims was a lack of Nellie
Crowther's intent to deliver the deed to Mr. Mower, again, a factual issue.
Mr. Mower asserts the facts cleary indicate Mrs. Crowther's intent to convey and
deliver the deed(s) to her son for the following reasons:
1. The deed was absolute on its face. And the deed is the best means available to establish
the parties' intent. Sweeny v. Sweeny, 11 A ^ 806 (Conn. 1940). Also the deed was
executed before the letter from Nellie Crowther's attorney was even written.
2. The letter sent to Mr. Mower (Exhibit B) by Nellie Crowther's attorney, also says, "Acting
upon your mother's request I am forwarding the two deeds to you, to complete the
transaction by which she transfers ownership to you. The return receipt will show that
you have received the two deeds, in case any question of delivery should ever arise."
(Emphasis added.) See Exhibit B paragraph 3.)
3. Mrs. Crowther stated in her own codicil to her will: "I have by quitclaim deed given to
my son one-half interest of my home and other real property." (SEE Exhibit C)
There was clearly a dispute between what the Appellee and the judge thought Nellie
Crowther's intent was, and what Mr. Mower thought it was. The Judge seems to have
blinding gone along with Appellee's initial remarks that the intent of Nellie Crowther was
undisputed and not material—initial remarks which were simply ludicrous. In addition, the
judge accepted a partial transcript of the Summit County case (SEE transcript, Page 7) which
was under appeal at the time and Judge Lewis obviously used this as a precedent case and
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used Judge Young's opinion for her ruling.

Nellie Crowther's intent to transfer ownership

was very much disputed as established by Mr. Mower's reasons above.
Moreover, by reading the judge's ruling, it is obvious that the judge's granting of
summary judgment turned on the judge's determination that Nellie Crowther had no intent to
deliver the deed to Mr. Mower, her son. Therefore, because the granting of the motion of
summary judgment turned on this issue, it was certainly a material fact.
The summary judgment turned on an issue of fact, not of law, therefore, the granting
of the motion for summary judgment should be overruled because in order for a nonmoving
party to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment and send the issue to a
factfinder, it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for
the nonmoving party to show facts that controvert those of the moving party's. Salt Lake
City Corp. v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P.d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Summary judgment
is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, admissions . . . show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). It has been established that the intent of Nellie Crowther was
disputed and material.
Point 3
Recording of a Deed Only Imparts
Notice of Claim
The trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded by a grantee does
not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in the property that is the subject of
the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint tenancy with right of survivorship until the deed is
recorded.
10

Judge Lewis was wrong because when Nellie Crowther died, the interest she held
with Appellee as joint tenants with rights of survivorship terminated when she conveyed her
interest in the property to her son, Mr. Mower. The law on this area is very clear and well
rooted in American jurisprudence. A joint tenancy with right of survivorship is created when
there is unity of time, title, interest and possession exist. Merrick v. Peterson, 606 P.d 700
(Wash App. 1980). However, "Conveyance by one joint tenant of his or her interest severs
joint tenancy, transforming it into tenancy in common, thereby extinguishing right of
survivorship." Lyon v. Lyon, 670 Rd 272 (Wash. 1983); Jolley v. Corry, 671 Rd 139 (Utah
1983).
Judge Lewis stated in her ruling that: "...while a presumption of valid delivery arises
where a deed has been executed and recorded, here it is clear that recording did not occur
until several days after Mrs. Crowther's death. By the time of this recording, title had already
passed to the surviving joint tenant, Mr. Crowther, the Plaintiff." Judge Lewis was wrong.
When Nellie Crowther conveyed her interest to her son, Mr. Mower, by a quitclaim deed that
was absolute on its face as to giving him all her interest, Appellee's joint tenancy and right of
survivorship was destroyed. Mr. Mower had become a tenant in common with Appellee
when he was conveyed the property, two and 1/2 years before Nellie Crowther even died.
This is true even though the deed was not recorded by Mr. Mower until after Nellie
Crowther's death. "The intention of recording acts is to require persons claiming an interest
in real property to record such interests as will give notice of their claims." Chelan County v.
Wilson, 744 P.d 1106 (Wash App. 1987). This decision goes on to state " . . . unrecorded
conveyances are valid as between parties."
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This point is well entrenched in the United States common law: "It is the rule with
deeds as in the case of other instruments affecting the tile to land, that a deed, otherwise
valid, passes title from the grantor to the grantee although it has not been recorded."1 The
execution and delivery of a deed passes the estate and interest in the premises, the same as
livery of seisin at common law.2 Recording adds nothing to its effectiveness as a
conveyance; all that it accomplishes is to impart notice, and after its acceptance, failure to
record the deed will not revest title in the grantor.3 Despite diligent and exhaustive efforts by
Mr. Mower to find authority for the Court's ruling, no Utah case law or statutory authority
has been found that points up to the proposition that the conveyance from Nellie Crowther to
Mr. Mower should be ruled void because Mr. Mower did not record the conveyance until
after the death of his mother, Nellie Crowther.
Utah law is very clear that one who conveys an interest in property by quitclaim deed
conveys "all right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and to the premises therein
described and all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date of such
conveyance." Utah Code Annotated section 57-1-13 (1992 edition). Had the legislature
wanted to limit the validity of transfers by quitclaim deed to only those quitclaim-deed
transfers that were subsequently recorded, the legislature had the ability to do so. They did
not; creating, at least, the implication that they did not want recordation to be a condition

^an field v. Excelsior Ref. Co. , 135 U.S. 326; Burbank v.
Conrad, 96 U.S. 291; Warnock v. Harlow, 96 Cal 298, 31 P 166;
Hallett v. Alexander, 50 Colo. 37, 114 P 490. All of this is
still good law. They have all been Shepardized.
2

See 23 Am Jur d, Deeds sections 76 et seq.

3

Lake v. Weaver, 74 A 451; J.C. Engelman Land Co. v. La
Blanco Agri. Co., 239 SW 937, 21 A.L.R. 1535.
12

upon quitclaim transfers.
This general principle of conveyances binding the parties to the transaction even if
they are not subsequently recorded is well stated in Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist
Church of Beryl Iron County, 642 P.d 371 (Utah 1982). "A conveyance of real property is
valid and binding between parties even without recordation." Therefore, the unrecorded
transfer by Nellie Crowther to her son, Appellant, Bryan Mower, is valid even though Bryan
Mower did not record the transfer until his mother, Nellie Crowther, died.
Moreover, Appellee asserted that Mr. Bryan Mower should not be awarded the
property conveyed to him by quitclaim deed because there was an invalid delivery from
Bryan Mower's mother to Bryan Mower. However, Appellee errs in this assertion. The deed
that Nellie Crowther conveyed to Mr. Mower, her son, was absolute on its face: "Nellie D.
Crowther grantor . . . hereby quitclaims to Bryan Mower grantee " • . .Lot 7, Block 1,
ROCKWOOD SUBDIVISION." Nellie Crowther also had the deed witnessed and notarized
by a Utah notary public. ("Exhibit D" hereto attached.) The moment she did this and sent her
son, Bryan Mower, the deed, her interest in the above-described property ended, severing the
joint tenancy with right of survivorship held by her and Appellee. By giving her son a deed
that conveyed absolute ownership of all her interest in the questioned property on its face,
Utah law recognized Bryan Mower as the sole owner of her former interest. Utah Code
Annotated 57-1-13. And the joint tenancy with right of survivorship ended. The deed
clearly passed beyond Nellie Crowther's "control or domain" as required by Utah law in order
for there to be a valid delivery. Wiggle v. Cheney, 597 Rd 1351, 1352 (Utah 1979).
Wiggle is one of Appellee's primary cited authorities. However, a look at the facts
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clearly indicate Wiggle is not on point and supports Mr. Bryan Mower's assertion that title
indeed passed because a valid delivery was effected. In Wiggle, the Court held that where,
following disposition of deed, grantor advised her executor that his name was on a safe
deposit box and instructed him that upon her death, he was to go to the bank where he would
be granted access to the safe deposit box and its contents, grantor remained in sole possession
and control in deed in question until her death and, thus, subsequent manual delivery of deed
by executor to grantee conveyed no title to property described therein, or any part thereof, or
any of its contents. These facts are a far cry from the case at hand: Nellie Crowther had a
quitclaim deed notarized, and witnessed, then sent the deed to her son, Mr. Mower, by
certified mail to ensure it would be duly delivered. She lived in Utah at the time and so
mailing the deed was the only way to deliver it to Mr. Mower, in California. She used the
best possible delivery means available to her under the circumstances short of paying
someone to fly to California and hand deliver the deed. After this delivery of the quitclaim
deed that by its terms conveys absolutely all her ownership in the property, she retained no
right to "reclaim or recall" her property interest, which is all she was required to do to effect
a valid delivery. Hanns v. Hanns, 423 P.d 499, 509 (Oregon 1967).
Had Nellie Crowther wanted to maintain control over the property until she died, she
certainly could have deposited the deed with an escrow agent, which is what many people do
when they want to ensure conditions are satisfied before deliver occurs. Chillemi v. Chillemi,
78 A.2d 750 (Md. 1951). Even preferred, she could have written the ostensible "conditions"
right in the deed itself, insuring complete control until she died, which she chose not to do.
Mrs. Crowther's intent was clear and because the deed was not recorded until
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subsequent to Mrs. Crowther's death does not, according to law, affect the validity of the
deed.

Conclusion
The court clearly erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded by a grantee does
not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in the property which is the subject
of the deed in question, and thus does not destroy a joint tenancy with right of survivorship
until the deed in recorded. Utah law is very clear that one who conveys and interest in
property by quitclaim deed conveys "all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and to
the premises therein." Recording only serves notice.
Mrs. Crowther's intent was to leave her interest in the property as indcated by the
deed, the letter from Mr. Wharton (Mrs. Crowther's attorney) and her own codicil (Exibit C)
to her will.
Thsi court should, as in the companion case in Summit County, give full force and
effect to all provisions of the Utah Laws, cited above, and reverse the District Court's original
decision and rule summarily for the Appellant.

day of October, 1994.
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Attorneys:
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Salt Lake, for Appellant
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Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme.
DAVIS, Judge:
Appellant Bryan D. Mower appeals from a final summary
judgment, ordering him to quit claim interest in a parcel of real
property in favor of appellee Dean W. Crowther. We reverse and
remand.
FACTS
Nellie Crowther, Crowther's wife and Mower's mother, owned
in joint tenancy with Crowther, a parcel of real property (the
Property), in Summit County, where the Crowthers resided.
On December 15, 1988, Mrs. Crowther executed a quit claim
deed conveying her interest in the Property to her son Mower, who
was living in Simi Valley, California. Mrs. Crowther's attorney,
W. Paul Wharton, sent the quit claim deed, together with a copy
of a codicil to Mrs. Crowther's will, to Mower via certified
mail.
In Wharton's letter of transmittal, dated December 16, 1988,
he noted that he was including the quit claim deed, along with a

deed for another parcel of property. He stated, "Acting ut m
your Mother's request, I am forwarding the two Deeds to yc . to
complete the transaction by which she transfers ownership D you*
The Return Receipt will show that you have received the t*
Deeds, in case any question of delivery should ever arise • He
also stated, "please keep this letter . . . as an indica-.on of
your Mother's intention to deliver the deeds and how tha.; was
accomplished." Earlier in the letter, he stated,
As you know, your Mother wanted to be
sure that you receive a 1/2 interest in her
property; her intention is to leave the other
1/2 to her step-children. There are two
possible chain of events—either your Mother
dies before her husband does, or she dies
after he does. If she dies first, you should
promptly, as soon as it is possible, record
the two deeds with the respective County
Recorder. If your step-father dies first, I
would suggest you contact me (after you've
discussed matters with your Mother).
Mrs. Crowther's codicil, signed December 14, 1988, stated "I
have by Quit-claim Deed, given to my son one-half of my home and
other real property."
Mrs. Crowther died August 9, 1991, while still married to
Crowther. Six days later, on August 15, 1991, Mower recorded the
quit claim deed.
Crowther instituted a quiet title action against Mower
claiming that the deed did not terminate the joint tenancy
because of Mower's failure to record the deed prior to Mrs.
Crowther's death. Crowther claimed that, upon Mrs. Crowther's
death, the Property vested in him by reason of survivorship.
Neither party disputed that the deed was delivered, nor did they
claim that the quit claim deed was ambiguous on its face. Both
parties moved for summary judgment and for attorney fees. Mower,
although he initially appeared pro se, requested fees incurred
for "bonds and various consulting charges."
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Crowther. The minute entry reveals only that the court granted
summary judgment in favor of Crowther and that attorney fees
would be awarded. The summary judgment, entered April 14, 1993,
stated that the court found "no material uncontroverted facts"
and that Crowther was entitled to attorney fees. The court
declared the quit claim deed to be "null and void and of no force
or effect whatsoever." The court then awarded Crowther $1300 in
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
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Mower moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment.
The court denied the motion and made another minute entry
stating, "The court has found that [Mrs. Crowther] did not have
such present intent to [convey] as evidenced by the instructions
from counsel . . . .
The court has found that there was lacking
a present intent to sever the joint tenancy and thus the later
filing of the deed was ineffective to convey an interest to
[Mower] .fl
After judgment was entered, Mower moved for reconsideration
of the attorney fees award. The court denied this motion, making
the following minute entry: "The Court has been concerned with
the plethora of irrelevant and spurious documents filed by
[Mower] in this matter."
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Wineqar
v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). "In reviewing
the trial court's ruling, we accept the facts and inferences in
the light most favorable to the losing party. Because summary
judgment is granted as a matter of law, we may reconsider the
trial court's legal conclusions." Wineqar, 813 P.2d at 107.
ANALYSIS
I.

Dissolution of Joint Tenancy

When a joint tenant makes "a bona fide conveyance of his
interest in property to a third party, . . . this has the effect
of terminating the joint tenancy, and converting the ownership
into a tenancy in common." Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594, 596
(Utah 1979); accord Clearfield State Bank v. Centos, 562 P.2d
622, 624-25 (Utah 1977); Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 301
P. 2d 1086, 1090 (Utah 1956) (joint tenant who conveys or
mortgages real property terminates joint tenancy and creates
tenancy in common).
"[EJither party to a joint tenancy may terminate it . . .
and . . . the consent of the other tenants to the severance or
termination is not required." 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 16 at
343 (1981); accord Nelson. 592 P.2d at 596, 597; Clearfield State
Bank, 562 P.2d at 624-25.
The valid conveyance itself destroys the joint tenancy, and
a joint tenant need not notify the other tenant or record the
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conveyance. See Burke v. Stevens, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90-91 (Cal.
App. 1968) ("It was unnecessary in connection with the execution
of such a deed that there should be notification to the other
joint tenant and unnecessary that the deed be recorded; neither
acknowledgment or recordation is necessary."); 48A C.J.S. Joint
Tenancy § 17 at 345.
"Survivorship is the distinctive characteristic or major
incident of an estate in joint tenancy." 48A C.J.S. Joint
Tenancy § 3 at 3 02. However, survivorship is an expectancy and
not a future interest because a joint tenant has but a
"conditional opportunity of becoming the owner of the whole
interest." Estate of Breckon Ty. Tax ComiR'n, 591 P. 2d 442, 443
(Utah 1979).
"The effect of a severance by a joint tenant is to terminate
the incident of survivorship as between him and the other joint
tenants." 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 19 at 351 (citing TracyCollins, 301 P.2d at 1090); accord 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and
Joint Ownership §§ 14 & 16 at 108, 109 (1965).
Accordingly, Mrs. Crowther had no interest in the Property
at the time of her death, having transferred her interest to
Mower, and Crowther's ownership interest had already changed from
a joint tenancy to a tenancy in common.
II.

Effect of Failure to Record

Crowther argues that Mrs. Crowther did not convey her
interest because Mower failed to record the deed prior to her
death, or alternatively, that Mrs. Crowther did not intend to
transfer her interest. We disagree.
A quit claim deed, "when executed as required by law shall
have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest and
estate of the grantor in and to "Che premises therein described
and all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging,
at the date of such conveyance." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13
(1994). The fact that such a deed is not recorded or that
recording is delayed "does not affect the validity of a document
with respect to the parties to the document and all other persons
who have notice of the document." Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2(3).
In fact, Utah's recording laws "do not make recordation a
prerequisite to the validity of a deed." Greaerson v. Jensen,
669 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1983) (unrecorded deed valid against
interest of subsequent buyers who failed to record their own
interest); Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 14 P. 338, 339 (Utah 1887)
(unrecorded conveyance valid between parties and to all parties
having actual notice), aff'd. 142 U.S. 241, 12 S. Ct. 158 (1891).
Nor is compliance with the recording statute necessarily a
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prerequisite to enforcing the terms of the deed. Larson v.
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Utah App. 1991);
cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992).
On the other hand, an unrecorded deed is void against a
subsequent purchaser who purchases in good faith and for valuable
consideration and who first duly records the deed. Utah Code
Ann. § 57-3-3; see Herman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah
App. 1987) (grantor has no duty to record, while grantee has
option to record or assume risk of subsequent grantee acquiring
superior rights by recordation). A joint tenant does not, by
reason of that status, qualify as a good faith purchaser for
purposes of the recording statute.
Thus, a conveyance is valid when the grantor, with present
intent to convey, delivers the deed. Wineqar v. Froerer Corp.,
813 P.2d 104, 110 (Utah 1991); Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 635
(Utah 1984). Recordation is immaterial in determining whether a
conveyance has terminated a joint tenancy. See Burke v. Stevens,
70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90-91 (Cal. App. 1968); 48A C.J.S. Joint
Tenancy § 17 at 345 (1981).
Here, the fact that Mower delayed recording the quit claim
deed does not affect its validity as between him and his mother,
and Crowther is not a subsequent purchaser. Utah Code Ann. § 573-2(3). Thus, the fact that Mower delayed recording the deed is
irrelevant to Crowther7s claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3.
III.

Intent of Grantor

A conveyance is valid upon delivery of a deed with present
intent to transfer. Wineqar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 110
(Utah 1991); Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1984).
"If the contract is in writing and the language is not
ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined from
the words of the agreement." Wineqar, 813 P.2d at 108. "A court
may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful
consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain."
Id.
Here, neither party claims the language of the quit claim
deed is ambiguous. Moreover, the language of the codicil
supports Mrs. Crowther's intent to convey: "I have by Quit-claim
Deed, given to my son one-half of my home and other real
property."
Wharton's letter also supports Mrs. Crowther's intent to
convey under the quit claim deed. The letter stated that Wharton
was forwarding the deed "to complete the transaction by which she

930446-CA

5

transfers ownership to you." The letter stated that one of its
purposes was to indicate "your Mother's intention to deliver the
deeds and how that was accomplished."
The language of the quit claim deed supports a conclusion
that the quit claim deed is unambiguous as a matter of law. We
determine that, as a matter of law, the evidence is
uncontroverted that at the time Mrs. Crowther had the deed
delivered, she had the present intent to convey the Property. We
therefore remand for entry of judgment dismissing Crowther's
complaint with prejudice and granting Mower such relief as may be
necessary to effectuate the validity of Mrs. Crowther's quit
claim deed.
IV.

Attorney Fees

Mower claims the court erred as a matter of law in awarding
attorney fees in favor of Crowther pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.
Rule 11 provides:
The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certification by him that he
has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law,
and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation.
Rule 11 provides that when a pleading is signed in violation of
the Rule, the court shall impose a reasonable attorney fee.
Given our determination that Mower's position at trial was
warranted by existing law, we must likewise reverse the trial
court's attorney fee award and refuse to award Crowther attorney
fees on appeal.
Crowther's arguments on appeal were "warranted by existing
law" to the extent they were based on an outstanding order of a
trial judge. See Rimensburcrer v. Rimensburaer, 841 P.2d 709, 712
(Utah App. 1992). Thus, we do not award Mower attorney fees on
appeal.
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CONCLUSION
We reverse the summary judgment and remand with instructions
to enter judgment in favor of Mower and to enforce the terms of
Mrs. Crowther's quit claim deed. We also reverse the trial
courts award of attorney fees and award Crowther no attorney
f ees^0TT"abpeal.

Jamerk/Z. DavTsT^3udge

I CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

I CONCUR, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SECTION III IN WHICH I CONCUR IN
RESULT ONLY:

Gregorv^K. Orme, Judge
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES,

INC.
124 SOUTH 400 EAST • 4TH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
(801) 328-8891

WATS

1-800-662-4245

December 16, 1988

Bryan Mower
1564 Acapulco Crt.
Simi Valley, California

93065

Dear Mr. Mower:
Enclosed are the originals of three documents: a) a
Quit-claim Deed regarding the house at 2620 Elizabeth Street in
Salt Lake City; b) a Quit-claim Deed regarding some recreational
property in Summit County; and c) a Codicil to your Mother's Will.
Keep them in a safe place.
As you know, your Mother wanted.to be sure that you
receive a 1/2 interest in her property; her intention is to leave
the other 1/^ to her step-children. There are two possible chain
of events -- either your Mother dies before her husband does, or
she dies after he does. If she dies first, you Should promptly, as
soon as it is possible, record the two deeds with the respective
County Recorder. If your step-father dies first, I would suggest
you contact me (after you've discussed matters with your Mother).
We will need to know whether Dean Crowther did anything to affect
or alter the ownership or testamentary disposition of his portion
of the property, before we can decide what needs to be done with
the Deeds.
You will have noticed, no doubt, that this letter
arrived by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested. Acting upon
your Mother's request, I am forwarding the two Deeds to you, to
complete the transaction by which she transfers ownership to you.
The Return Receipt will show that you have* received the two Deeds,
in case any question of delivery should ever arise. A copy of this
letter, together with the Return Receipt, is in your Mother's file

DjLyau 1'iuwer

Page 2
December 16, 1988
here (our #88-02390). Earlier in this letter I asked you to keep
the documents in a safe place -- please keep this letter with them,
as an indication of your Mother's intention to deliver the deeds
and how that was accomplished.
Please call me if any questions arise.
Very truly yours,

W. PAUL WHARTON
Attorney at Law
SENIOR CITIZEN LAW CENTER
WPW/bj
cc:

Nellie D. Crowther
c/o Mable Hammond

Enclosures
Certified Mail Receipt No.: P07 5787592

G
FIRST CODICIL TO THE
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
NELLIE D. CROWTHER
I, NELLIE D. CROWTHER, of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, being at least eighteen years of age, of sound mind and
memory, and acting under no restraint or duress of any kind, do
hereby make, publish and declare this instrument to be the FIRST
CODICIL to my Last Will and Testament executed on the 11th of
August, 1987, at Salt Lake County, Utah, and do hereby republish
said Will with the following change:
The second paragraph of the section entitled "RESIDUARY
LEGATEES" is revised in its entirety to read as follows:
In the event that DEAN W. CROWTHER does not survive me,
I give all of the rest, residue and remainder of my property,
whether real, personal or mixed, and wherever situated, together
with any property over which I may have power of appointment to my
son and step-daughters, named above, as follows:

I have by

Quit-claim Deed, given to my son one-half of my home and other
real property; I hereby give the other half of each, if I have
received an interest by the probate of DEAN W. CROWTHER1s estate
or otherwise, to my three step-daughters*

All of the rest of my

estate I give to the four children, share and share alike.

In the

event that one or more of my children predecease me, each deceased
child's share of my estate shall be equally divided among that
child's children.
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EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENT
I, NELLIE D. CROWTHER, the Testatrix, sign my name to
this instrument this

/&-cL

day of

/i

c r <, .,. (< i —

, 1988,

and being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned
authority that I sign and execute this instrument as the FIRST
CODICIL to my Last Will.
^

'' /

t

'

r /

NELLIE D. CROWTHER
/?
K
J?'/sO!fi&^

We, K3s\-*^<> i.s
J*£/. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 7 ^ ^ ^ / ^

and
, the witnesses, sign our

names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby
declare to the undersigned authority that the Testatrix signs and
executes this instrument as the FIRST CODICIL to her Last Will and
that she signs it willingly and that each of us, in the presence
and hearing of the Testatrix and of each other, hereby signs this
Codicil as witness to the Testatrix's signing, and that to the
best of our knowledge the Testatrix is eighteen years of age or
older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence.
"7

In the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, on this
day of
\^- • " •*— V>*<~"
/ 1988, before me, the undersigned
Notary, personally appeared NELLIE D. CROWTHER, the Testatrix,
[] who is personally known by me
proved to me her identity through documentary evidence
> - ^ v *^r
form of S Y V \ > M ^ . - \v
li:
to be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document,
who duly acknowledged to me that she has read and fully
understands it, executed the same voluntarily and for the purposes

B^°
in the

2 of 3

^', dl C

set forth, and that she was acting under no constraint or undue
influence whatsoever.
Also personally appeared before me the witnesses
[] who is personally known by me
riWho proved to me his/her identity through documentary evidence
^ i n the form of yyy TX- L w^x, <- ^ . ^^^^-A--% ^
,
and

C

rxrKc c ^ ^ S

U._Y^S>^

[7|^ho is personally known by me
who proved to me his/her identity through documentary evidence
in the form of
,
to be the persons whose names are signed on the preceding
document, and who each acknowledged to me that this document is
signed voluntarily for its stated purpose.
•

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

^u,c

^QTXr-

My Commission Expires:
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When r e c o r d e d , r e t u r n t o :

(fuit-Clatm Btth
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KATIE
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DIXON

RECORDER* SALT Lft^L u>UN~i« UTAH
BRYAN nOUER
«0 -• QUIETwOOD LN SAND" LT S4C-:
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THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT
IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE
NELLIE DEE CROWTHER, Grantor, of 2620 Elizabeth
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to
BRYAN MOWER, Grantee, of 1564 Acapulco Street, Simi
Valley, California 93065, for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other
good and valuable consideration, the following described tract
of land in -Stewwtit County, State of Utah:
Lot 7, Block 1, ROCKWOOD SUBDIVISION,
according to the official plat thereof,
recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.
RESERVING, however, to DEAN W. CROWTHER, a
lifetime right to occupy the premises.
This Deed is given to transfer all of
Grantor's interest in and to the premises
as well as Grantor's interest in and to
that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract
dated June 15, 1972, wherein GEORGE K.
GROVER and SHIRLEY H. GROVER appear as
Sellers and DEAN W. CROWTHER and NELLIE D.
CROWTHER appear as Buyers, and recorded
November 22, 1988, Entry No. 4705045.
WITNESS the hand of the said grantor this
of

/

Lc 1+ <^>K/<>«- /*—-

e

' *>'<&

day

1988.

/>

d v- '*- v C~/ cu.i^7^/

NELLIE DEE CROWTHER
STATE OF UTAH
ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

On the \ ^ day of
X^>^, ^-wS^v 1988, personally
appeared before me, a Notary Public, NELLIE DEE CROWTHER
who proved to me her identity through documentary evidence in
the form of \TV ^ > v ^ ^ \ w,. - \ > V N , S ^ V S to be
the person whose name is signed on the preceding document, who
cU^Ly '^CKhpwIedged to me that she executed the same.
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NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission expires:

w-
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^yr-
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